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Preface
This is a record of a lecture titled “Comparative 
History of Technology” which outlines the 
historical development of industrial technology 
in the Modern Japan. The lecture has been read 
by the author at Hiroshima University to the 
undergraduate students in Japanese language for 
a period of more than two decades. This record 
treats with the fi rst half of the lecture; that is, from 
the early modern times in the late 16th century to 
the World War II. The second part, that includes 
the period just after the World War II upto the 
end of the High Economic Growth phase, will be 
submitted in the following number of this journal 
or its successor. The part that describes about the 
modern economic history of England and Germany 
as the object of comparison, which was also read 
in the lecture, has been omitted in this record. The 
lecture targets at the enrichment of the students’ 
comprehension on Japan’s experience in its 
universality and its peculiarity in world history of 
technology. 
In difference with the well-accepted works 
written or edited by Morris Low1 that cover also 
the cultural context, this lecture is solely comprised 
of the socio-economic perspectives. 
This record takes the form of a textbook (in 
a summarized style) rather than that of a scientifi c 
paper. This record gives a list of literature towards 
the last of each chapter unlike as it is done in 
the case of a scientific paper, where sources of 
quotations are provided in the footnotes on their 
respective pages. Many tables and illustrations that 
were cited in the printed materials for the lecture in 
the Japanese language have not been stated here. 
I. Pre-modern Agriculture and Farm Village
Let us begin with a comparison of the 
agricultural state in the medieval or early modern 
Japan to that in the Medieval Europe. The 
condition of Japan could be known through the 
Taikô Ken-chi chô in the last stage of the Sengoku 
(Warring States) period, which was compiled in 
the late 16th century and the state in the Medieval 
Europe could be traced, for example, of the 11th 
century England, through “Doomsday Books,” 
which were compiled in the 11th century during the 
phase of Norman Conqueror. Autonomy and status 
of the feudal estates made it diffi cult for compiling 
overall statistics for the entire nations and so, only 
a few exceptional records have been utilized. 
At the same time, the difference of the time 
frame during Medieval times in between Northern 
Europe (England) and Japan must be taken into 
consideration. Appearance of the independent 
peasant family may be regarded as the criteria of 
Feudalism. The Roman slavery rule in the north 
Fig.1, The three-fi eld system
Source: Internet Source (http://circlesofinnovation. 
valenciacollege.edu/2014/05/21/infographic-map-
of-3-fi eld-system/)
Fig.2, Rice fi eld. 




European regions was so superficial that the 
ancient German clan societies revived through the 
“Great Germanic Movement” and the independent 
peasant families got raised without much diffi culty. 
On contrary, in Japan, shift from the slavery system 
to feudalism was much vaguer. Dissolution of 
“Myô,” as a basic unit of slavery (after the collapse 
of the ancient despotism), was very slow. The 
deep-rooted ancient aristocratic powers survived 
until their elimination by a series of reformation 
from “Taikô Ken-chi” to the establishment of the 
shogunate power of Tokugawa Dynasty. 
In English regions, the moist climate belt 
accompanied with relatively dry summer, required 
deep plowing and weeding twice a year, i.e., before 
sowing and after harvesting, both in the fallow 
season. The English peasants grew wheat, barley, 
oats, beans and other vegetation, depending upon 
the natural rainwater. All the nourishment from 
the surface soil was completely exhausted one 
time only. Therefore, periodical fallowing was 
necessary for the recovery of fertility. The Three 
Field System and the Open Farm System, which 
was accompanied by the dispersion of the arable 
land of one peasant family into at least three fi elds, 
had been developed. 
Contrary to England, in case of Japan, which 
also belonged to the moist climate belt, but, 
accompanied with rainy seasons, the peasants 
traditionally grew rice (Oryza Japonica) on 
irrigated paddy fields that were enclosed in the 
levee. In addition to the labor-intensive work of 
building up the irrigation facilities, seeding culture, 
transplantation, frequent weeding, control of water 
supply and harvesting had to be done with ad hoc 
concentration of a great amount of labor force. 
However, water carried away the nourishment, 
every year. Hence, serial cultivation did not harm 
the soil. 
Furthermore, we should pay attention to the 
high harvest productivity of Oryza Japonica (about 
1,300 grains in one crop), which exceeded that 
of Oryza Indica by approximately three times. 
Oryza Japonica consists of three sub-classes: Non-
glutinous rice, Glutinous rice and “Sen (Tôboshi)”. 
The fi rst kind that lacks awn was obtained by doing 
improvement of a specie over a very long period of 
time through selective breeding. The usage of the 
second kind is almost limited to making rice cakes 
(Mochi). The last kind that remains awned was 
seen only in Southern China, which is of relatively 
low productivity and that also reduced the total 
harvest productivity of Oryza Japonica in China. 
Agr i cu l t u r e ,  i n  wh ich  i n s t an t aneous 
investment of a large amount of labor (joint work) 
is needed for jobs like seeding and harvesting, has 
Fig.3, Jōka-machi (Matsumoto City)
Source: Internet Source (https://www.matsumoto- castle.
jp/town/know/town-planning)
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a strong cooperative nature. In Medieval times, 
therefore, agriculture was conducted by rural 
communities which consisted of individual peasant 
families that owned arable lands. In many cases, 
village communities autonomously controlled 
the joint works necessary for agriculture and also 
the community life. On the other hand, feudal 
lords kept common conditions for agricultural 
production under their control by suppressing 
peasants with their armed forces, due to which 
village communities and peasants had to be their 
subordinates and pay tribute to them. The land 
lords in West European countries had relatively 
minor seizures, like pasture ground, forests and 
water mills (needed for pulverizing wheat, barley 
and oats into flour). Contrasting them, the land 
lords of Japan often ruled over the water supply 
for irrigation. Therefore, they obliged the peasants 
to pay relatively higher rate of tribute and hence, 
play control over the villages from remote cities 
where they were concentrated. However, in 
West European countries, the relatively weaker 
rule of the feudal lords upon their peasants had 
to be supplemented by immediate existence of 
compulsive power upon villages together with the 
extra-economical compulsion. Contrary to Japan’s 
case in which Samurais had built up many unique 
cities called Jôka-machi around their castles, the 
lords in Western Europe so often could not leave 
their own estates and compose the city as their 
important component. 
On the other side, land possession by the 
peasants on the concentrated irrigated fi elds which 
were surrounded by levee was also strong in Japan, 
unlike as in the case of West European peasants, 
who often possessed the dispersed fields shaped 
into belts for their agriculture. 
In the medieval time, the city’s economy 
mainly consisted of the commercial activities by 
craft manufacturers and merchants which were 
essentially supplementary and external to the rural 
economy that significantly acquired the greater 
part of population and products. However, the 
monetary system which had been essential in the 
city economy gradually infiltrated into the nearly 
self-sufficient rural economy. With dissemination 
of the monetary system, some peasant families 
grew prosperous. Differentiated economic status 
of peasants lead to the fluctuations in community 
principles and the menace upon the land lord’s 
economic power. In England, the dissolution 
process of feudalism began much earlier than 
that in Japan. With the Crusades and the Black 
Death (plague) in the background, Commutation 
(payment of land rent in currency) was widespread 
in the late fourteenth and early fi fteenth centuries, 
especially during and after a great peasant revolt, 
Wat Taylor’s Rebellion in 1381. Commutation 
means the tacit permission by the land lords 
to the peasants for doing free trade. The case 
of Japan in this aspect will be examined later.
*  *  *
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① Iinuma, Jirô, Sekai Nôgyô Bunka-shi (A Cultural 
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II. Crisis of Japanese Agriculture and 
Feudalism at the Early Modern Age
1. Crisis of Japanese Agriculture
Industrialization initiated by Industrial 
Revolution meant that the agricultural population 
must support (provide the food to) some portion 
of the total population who worked in some 
industry and did not engage themselves in any food 
production. Therefore, rapid growth of productivity 
in agriculture often preceded Industrial Revolution. 
In England, Agricultural Revolution was stimulated 
by the wide diffusion of Norfolk-type Rotation 
of crops like clover, barley, wheat, and turnip. In 
this case, the clover and turnip were used as the 
fodder in winter. The benefits were as follows; 
(1) the pasture ground for winter and the fallow 
ground were spared, (2) natural fertilizer was 
increased with the increase of domestic animals, 
(3) although deep plowing became necessary, a 
mechanical plow and seeding were invented. Later, 
the guano fertilizer imported from Chili was used 
in addition to domestic animal excrement. Thus, 
the three-field system completely declined. For 
such a reorganization of agriculture, the so-called, 
second “Enclosure Movement” (1760s–1840s) 
progressed throughout England, in 13.6% of whole 
territory, whereas the fi rst “Enclosure Movement” 
covered  only 2.76%. Such change in agriculture 
and farm villages led to a social change, which was 
rise of capitalism in agriculture. On the other hand, 
it was traditionally assumed that Japan’s history 
lacked such an experience and it rushed into the 
capitalist modern times without any notable growth 
of productivity in agriculture. However, in 1980s, 
such a view was revised with the appearance of 
several new approaches in historical study which 
were pioneered by Ôishi, Shinzaburô and others. 
The Edo Period (1603-1867) can be regarded 
as the Great Age of Land Development. After the 
recovery of peace together with the establishment 
of the shogunate power, the feudal clans were 
enthusiastic about land development. Later, 
mainly after 1770s, the merchants-in-contract 
undertook the development business under the 
permissions of the lords. The new rice field 
rapidly got increased. The total amount of rice 
crop on the official statistics (including some 
estimations) was increased from 18,505 thousand 
koku (1koku is approximately 180 lit.) in 1600 
to 32,220 thousand koku in 1867. Nevertheless, 
the total population of Japan remained almost 
unchanged for approximately 150 years; the 
population of peasants, craftsmen, merchants 
and others (except for Samurais, clergymen in 
Buddhism and Shintoism, the population of whom 
was not compiled officially) was 26,065,425 in 
1721, but even in 1846, it remained 26,907,625. 
The enlargement of rice fields didn’t lead to the 
population growth. How can we explain such a 
contradiction? 
First of all, we can mention some negative 
aspects accompanied with the external expansion 
of arable land; (1) Poor rice field was increased. 
(2) Some old rice field were left unrealized 
due to manpower requisition for new rice field 
development (In this case, the stagnated population 
growth also worked as a cause). (3) Flood 
frequently occurred due to the overexploitation 
and the poor civil engineering constructions for 
new arable land development, especially that of 
the water supply facilities. Among such aspects, 
the problem of so-called “Superannated rice fi eld” 
is noteworthy. For a very long time, the iron- and 
manganese-content carried away by water was 
extracted into the soil and was accumulated to an 
extent that hydrogen sulfate was generated from the 
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surface of the soil. Consequentially, the diseases of 
the rice crops, so-called Goma-ha-kare-byô(Aki-
ochi) or Nekusare-byô were frequently prevalent. 
The fi rst reference to such diseases can be seen in 
Aizu-Nôsho (published in 1684). 
A series of the countermeasures protecting 
crops  aga ins t  these  d iseases  were  taken . 
Agricultural techniques changed since the mid-
eighteenth century as follows: (1) Deep plowing 
cultivation got widespread with utilization of the 
hoes instead of plows for cultivation. Cows and 
oxen for plowing were not used anymore. The 
fields were cultivated by men with the hoes in 
their hands until the invention and diffusion of the 
short-bed plow in the second half of nineteenth 
century. (2) Ta-boshi (turning to the dry fi eld), or 
rice cropping fallows, were broadly utilized. Some 
portion of rice fi eld was turned for the cultivation 
of other crops that did not demand much of water, 
for example, the commodity crops like cotton in 
Kawachi district near the big city, Osaka. Such 
a measure encouraged the commercialization 
of agricultural crops, especially in the outskirts 
of big cities. (3) It was recommended to make 
the rice field dry once in the weeding period 
besides the harvest period (for taking advantage 
of nitrogen in the soil). Such a measure required 
some additional capital investment that included 
civil engineering works for building the drainage 
facilities (a waterway, a subway drain and others). 
(4) Improvement of plants by exchange of seeds 
between the landowners (for example, Yaroku-
mai invented in the Obi clan in Southern Kyûshû), 
village communities and private organizations 
(religious one, such as Fuji-dô). The Doi family 
in Kurose village near Hiroshima University had 
been engaged in the improvement of rice crops, by 
inventing such new sorts of rice seeds as Gin-bôzu 
and Aki-bôzu. (5) Usage of artifi cial fertilizers such 
as Hoshika (fermented sardine), Abura-kasu (oil 
cake extracted from rapeseed) as nitrogen fertilizer 
exceeding human or animal feces were widespread 
throughout Japan. Those fertilizers were purchased 
in currency by the villages. Thus, the regions 
producing them economically developed and 
the monetary economy flew into farm villages 
together with these commodities. For example, 
Kawamo Village in Muko province of Settsu 
district (near today’s Kobe city and one of the most 
economically developed area then) paid 18-20 
monme of silver (1 monme is nearly equivalent to 
3.75 grams) for Hoshika as early as in 1734. Thus, 
the peasants’ efforts to overcome the crisis and 
improve the agricultural techniques potentially 
prepared the future industrialization,2 not in terms 
of the labor productivity, but in terms of the harvest 
productivity.
Fig.4, Various kinds of hoes.
Source: Oka, Mitsuo, Iinuma Jirô and Horio Hisashi ed. 
Inasaku no Gijutsu to Riron (Technology and 
Theory of Rice Farming.)  Heibonsha 1990. p.231.
Fig.5, Various kinds of short-bed plows.
Source: ibid., p. 236.
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Fig.6, The drainage facilities for making the rice fi eld dry.
Source: ibid., p. 123.
Fig.7, The diffusion of Yaroku-mai
Source: ibid., p. 21.
2. The Social Change in Villages 
Above-mentioned reforms in agricultural 
techniques caused wide-spreading and deepening 
of monetary system into farm villages. Necessary 
differentiation of peasants took place in Japan 
also. Prosperous peasants turned Kôri-gashi (the 
usurers) for relatively poor peasants. Due to Ta-
hata Eidai Baibai no Kin (Act on the eternal 
prohibition of sales and purchases of arable land), 
the land ownership was not transferred to them. 
Therefore, they could not grew as great land 
owners, but as the usurers for borrowing money on 
the debtor’ lands as de fact collateral. In addition, 
under the prohibition of free cultivation (Ta-hata 
Katte Dukuri no Kin), the prosperous peasants 
could not develop commercial agriculture and other 
businesses freely, except for some food-processing 
businesses (typically, Sake, Miso, Shôyu) using 
the surplus rice, wheat and soybeans, which were 
cultivated without any special permission. Such 
businesses are often called Shôya Keiei. 
The shogunate power tried to reestablish 
their type of feudalism based upon the principle 
of “Supreme Proposition of Securing Land Lent 
in Kind (Yamada Moritarô)” i.e. prevention of 
infiltration of the monetary economy into farm 
villages; Kyôho no Kaikaku (1720's), Kan-sei no 
Kaikaku (1790's) and Tenpô no Kaikaku(1830's) 
were such trials. Through these reforms, the 
shogunate power repressed peasants' riots and 
enforced high rate land-lent in kind (rice crops) 
upon them. In difference with the former two 
reforms, however, Tenpô no Kaikaku was not 
successful; peasants’ riots frequently burst forth 
and a significant population fled out of villages 
(some of the refugees turned out to be the notorious 
Yakuza, mainly in the outskirt area of Edo). 
Control upon the commercial activities through 
Kabu-nakama (trade associations) could not help 
on being abandoned. The dissolution of Kabu-
nakama lead the prosperous peasants to a variety 
of business opportunities in their villages.
*  *  *
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III. Transplanting of Modern Technology 
immediately before and after the Meiji 
Restoration. 
1. “Open Door” and the Crisis of Japanese 
Feudalism
Spontaneous dissolution process of Japanese 
feudalism since Tenpô era (1830s) was accelerated 
by the pressure from abroad. Commodore of the 
U.S. Navy, Matthew Calbraith Perry and his fl eet, 
the so-called “Black Ships,” came to Japan for the 
negotiation with the shogunate government for the 
Japan’s Open Door in 1853. In the following year, 
Japan’s government accepted the U.S. request and 
opened some ports for foreign trade. “Open Door” 
to European and American countries exposed the 
contradiction of a closed economy. Shogunate 
Japan adopted a unique and complicated currency 
system; The gold currency system (1 ryô =4 bu 
=16 shu) was adopted mainly by Samurais and the 
privileged merchants. On other hand, the silver and 
copper coins were used by the common people. 
Each of these systems worked independently from 
each other. Exchange of currency between the 
two systems was realized through the exchanging 
dealers. And then, what makes the matter more 
complicated is that the gold coin system adopted 
some silver coins as auxiliary coins. The U.S. 
negotiators took advantage of such a complicated 
structure. They succeeded in linking the U.S. 
currency with the gold coin system of Japan. One 
U.S. dollar (containing 24 grams of pure silver) 
was equivalent with three bu on the basis of the 
weight of the pure silver included in the auxiliary 
coins. However, then, one dollar gold coin 
contained only 1.5 gram of pure gold, whereas one 
ryô (Tenpô koban) held 6 grams of pure gold. The 
U.S. merchants who exchanged their silver conins 
for Japanese gold coins in Japan could gain much 
more gold, which was three times as much as that 
in the U.S. The development of trading with the 
U.S. and other western countries brought about 
outflow of a tremendous amount of gold from 
Japan. 
The Tokugawa government and the large clans 
purchased many naval ships and other armaments 
from the European countries for the enforcement 
of defence power. As for the civilian sector, Japan 
imported a great amount of cotton textile (fabrics 
and woolen stuff) and exported raw silk and 
others. Such a deficit in foreign trade furthered 
the outflow of gold. The shogunate government 
took a countermeasure against such outflow with 
the re-coinage. In 1859, the content of pure gold 
in one ryô coin was reduced to approximately 5 
grams, but in the following year, it was suddenly 
and drastically reduced to only 2 grams (Man-
en koban). Such re-coinage caused rapid rise in 
prices; 1 koku of rice was priced about 93.6 monme 
in 1857, but it was raised to 995.8 monme in 1867. 
Such hyper-inflation caused predicament of poor 
peasants and disturbance of lord economy. This 
economic crisis lead to Meiji Restoration.3
2. Transplanting of Western Technology.
Even before the “Black Ships” in 1853, the 
Opium War in 1840-1942 awakened nationalism 
among some far-sighted clan lords and several 
intel lectual  Samurais .  One of  such lords, 
Nabeshima, Naomasa (Kansô) from Saga clan 
took the initiative of building up Randen-ishibiya 
Seizôjo (the Gun Works) in 1842 and Seiren-
kata (the Refining Works) in 1850. Eventually, 
they succeeded in building the first reverberator 
in Japan, the Armstrong artillery guns, the steam 
boiler for the Chiyoda-gata boat and the Steam 
Boat, Ryôun maru. Besides him, Lord Shimazu, 
Nariakira from the Satsuma clan ordered to build 
Satsuma Shûsei-kan (the Comprehensive Factory) 
in 1852. It ran the glasshouse, the pottery works 
and the machine spinning works (1,800 spindles of 
Mule and 1848 spindles of Throstle). Immediately 
after the “Black Ships,” only within a year, 225 
clans applied to the Tokugawa government to 
Fig.10, Reverberator in Nirayama.




permit them to cast 1,657 cannon guns. Some blast 
furnaces were newly built in Satsuma, Nanbu-
Kamaishi, Komui and Ôtara (of Sendai), some 
reverberators; in Saga, Satsuma, Nirayama, 
Mito, Hagi, and Ôtara (of Okayama), and, some 
shipyards; in Yokosuka, Mito, Saga, Satsuma, 
Chôshû, Himeji, Sendai, Fukui, Tahara, Ôno, Tsu, 
Tosa, etc.
Fig.8, Saga, Seiren-kata (the Refi ning Works)
Source: Internet Source (https://sagajinjya.sagafan. jp/
e36923.html)
Fig.9, Satsuma Shûsei-kan. A picture taken in 1872.
Source: Internet Source (http://www.shuseikan. jp/about/)
However, their efforts to produce domestically 
such advanced industrial products were not so 
successful. Even in the year 1868, only 11 vessels 
of 45 government's vessels and 12 of 93 clan-owing 
vessels were built in Japan. The other vessels were 
imported. The purchasing price amounted to a total 
of 4,494,000 dollars (government purchase) and 
3,336,000 dollars (various clans purchased) with 
8,100 ryô in Japanese currency. The second place 
of imported goods was occupied by the cotton 
textiles – 3,770,000 dollars and then, the woolen 
fabrics – 3,490,000 dollars in 1867.
What is more important here is that as the 
fate of “Iron and Arms” which was demanded 
for military power reinforcement, the efforts to 
industrialize various weapons and armaments 
were considerably declined in accordance to 
the restoration of peace after the end of Seinan 
Sensô (the revolt in Satsuma district head by 
Saigô, Takamori, one of the great leaders of 
Meiji Restoration) in 1878. In 1889, the domestic 
production of the iron and steel satisfied only 
18.9% of the domestic demand and only 9.6% 
(10,665 tons) of the total supply was consumed by 
the army and navy. The army and navy arsenals 
were rearranged and unified to only five places 
(Osaka Artillery Arsenal, Tokyo Artillery Arsenal, 
Yokosuka Naval Yard, Onohama Shipyard and 
Akabane Naval Arsenal). The annual output of 
steel in Osaka Artillery Arsenal, the largest arsenal, 
was only 2,953.1 tons. 
In 1874, even Osaka, the most industrialized 
prefecture, provided hand-made or craft goods like 
the food processing products (7.8% of all industrial 
goods), the textiles (7.5%), the pottery (6.2%), 
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the instruments (6.2%), some sorts of oil (4.3%) 
and others. Transplanting of modern technology 
immediately before and after the Meiji Restoration 
could not change the pre-modern economic 
structure as a whole. 
*  *  *
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IV. Industrial Revolution I―Cotton Spinning 
Technology: "The Bottom-up Way" or 
"Top-down Way " of Modernization.4 
1. Development of Japanese Cotton Industry
Tenpô-no-Kaikaku liberated cotton planting 
from the Osaka cotton merchants '  control. 
The prosperous peasants began to plant more 
cotton. The total annual product of cotton 
crops was increased after the Meiji Restoration 
from 37,800,000 kin (1kin≒ 600g) in 1867 to 
88,370,000 kin in 1877. The cotton planting was 
developed in the relatively warm districts; In 
Mikawa 10.5% of total amount of Japanese raw 
cotton was produced (1877). In Kawachi – 8.6%. 
In Settsu – 8.3%. In Aki – 5.9%. In Owari – 5.8%. 
In Hôki – 4.0%. In Yamato – 3.7%. In Hitachi – 
3.5%. In Harima – 3.3%. In Musashi – 3.2%. The 
cotton was spun by human hands (in a cottage 
style) using only a spinning wheel and a short bar 
in a hand. 
Concerning the influence of the “Open 
Door” in mid 1850s, Shimazu, Nariakira, one of 
the greatest and far-sighted clan lords in those 
days said, “What is most terrible is neither a 
warship nor a cannon, but only cotton cloth.” 
Following his instructions, the Shimazu family of 
Satsuma founded Sakai Spinning Mill in1870 and 
Kagoshima Spinning Mill in 1872. Before them, 
however, as early as in 1867, the former privileged 
merchant of Tokugawa Dynasty, Kashima, Manpei 
also founded his own mill, Kashima Spinning 
Mill. These three mills were often called Shiso san 
bôseki (Three Founders of Machine Spinning).
Fig.11, Cotton spinning in Meiji era.
Source: Internet Source (http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp 
/TENJI/virtual/farsari/42.jpg)
In addition to these three Founders, the new 
government built two state pilot-plants in Aichi and 
Hiroshima Prefectures in 1881-1882 and developed 
the policy to promote Jukki-bô, the “10 Basic 
Cotton Mills,” by inducing the private investors 
to construct modern cotton spinning mills through 
a policy of the no-interest-lent of machines for 10 
years from the government. Nevertheless, these 
early efforts were not successful. Each of them had 
only 2,000 spindle-scale. The most of the water 
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mills introduced in those days were not suitable 
for the unstable water resources of Japan which 
had the high-water seasons in a year. And then, the 
most important is the inadequacy of the East Asian 
kind of cotton fiver (short and hard) to the Mule 
spinning machines and the Throstle frames. The 
yarn of the short and hard cotton fiver very often 
snapped with such machines. 
Fig.12, The Mule spinning machine.
Source: Unno, Fukuju ed., Gijutsu no Shakai-shi 3: Seiô 
Gijutsu no Inyû to Meiji-Shakai (A Social History of 
Technology 3: Transplanting of Western Technology 
and the Society in Meiji Era.) Yûhikaku, 1982. 
p.153.
Fig.13, Twisting action of the Mule machine.
Source: ibid., p.154.
Contrary to such failure with the Mule 
spinning machines and the Throstle frames, Gaun, 
Tokimune, an independent inventor outside the 
establishment, succeeded in mechanical spinning 
of such short and hard cotton fi ver. He said, “I am 
never willing to learn Western-style of designs. 
I am quite satisfied with my own designs.” His 
invention, the so-called Gara-bô spinning mills, 
gained high reputation in the First National 
Industrial Exposition in 1877. Gottfried Wagener, 
a government advisor, admired it as “the best 
invention in this Exposition.” In this spinning 
machine, a roller pulls up a yarn from a rotating 
tin cylinder that is full of raw cotton and which 
is lifted to some extent with the movement of the 
yarn. Gara-bô was spread all over the cotton-
cultivating districts (Shizuoka, Aichi, and Osaka). 
It supported the small manufactures ran by 
prosperous peasants, many of which had set up 
the Gara-bô machines inside a boat, the so-called 
Funa-ya (works-in-boat), in order to be saved from 
the infl uence of the water level changes. 
Fig.14, Gara-bô spinning mill
Source: Internet Source (https://www.ndl.go.jp/ exposition/
data/R/908r.html#EXHIBIT_1)
Fig.15, Funa-ya (works-in-boat) with Gara-bô machines.
Source: Unno ed., op. cit., pp.142, 143.
Fig.16, Principle of the Ring machine.
Source: ibid., p.158.
Fig.17, Sangen-ya factory of Osaka Bôseki-Gaisha
Source: ibid., p.144. 
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On the other hand, Shibusawa,Ei-ichi, the 
outstanding organizer of modern business in 
Japan and then, President of the First National-
patented Bank, made great efforts of capital 
procurement for the  Yunyû Bôatsu, the prevention 
of dependence upon the imported textile. He 
succeeded in gathering capital from the former 
lords (National Bond for Feudal Salary) and the 
wholesale merchants of raw cotton and cotton 
yarn in Osaka (250,000 yen) and established 
Osaka Bôseki-Gaisha (Osaka Cotton-spinning 
Company) in 1882, which built their own factory 
in Shikan-jima, a factory equipped with 15,000 
spindles and the steam power in the following year. 
Shibusawa adopted the Ring spinning machine on 
the recommendation by the young talent, Yamabe 
Takeo who was asked by Shibusawa to research 
on the machine spinning suitable for Japanese raw 
cotton, while he stayed in Great Britain for the 
study of political economy.  The company achieved 
a great success. After that success, many private 
companies with more than 10,000 spindles of the 
Ring machines operated by the steam engines were 
established one after another. Their share in the 
sales markets exceeded half of the demand as early 
as in 1891. They pressured Gara-bô manufacturers. 
This means “the Historical Defeat of the Bottom-
up Way” of Japanese capitalism. Some of the grass-
roots capitalists, i.e. the former prosperous peasants 
whose potential growth as modern capitalists was 
denied, took part in Jiyû-Minken Undô, i.e. Liberal 
and Democratic Movement, and took a series of 
the opposing actions to the Meiji absolutism. 
The rapid expansion of cotton spinning 
industry lead to the rapid increase of raw cotton 
demand. Whereas 55% of the demand was satisfi ed 
with the domestic raw cotton in 1887, that ratio 
was reduced to 25% only two years later, in 1889. 
In this year, 68% of the demand was satisfi ed with 
the imported cotton with short and hard fiver, 
similar to the domestic kind, from China. However, 
the cotton spinning manufacturers developed the 
unique Kon-men (cotton-mixture) technique to 
mix the East-Asian raw cotton with the long and 
soft fiber-kind cotton introduced from India and 
America for keeping high quality and for being 
able to compete with the English cotton textile 
goods. And then, to make the transportation cost 
low, they attempted to use home-country ships 
against the monopoly of British Pacific Ocean 
Steamship Company. Under the slogan, “Cheap 
raw cotton, cheap goods,” Nihon Yûsen, a shipping 
company, and Bôseki-Rengô-kai, a business circle 
of cotton spinning manufacturers, pioneered the 
route directly to Bombay (recently known as 
Mumbai) for the purchase of Indian raw cotton 
in 1893, using a steam ship named, Hiroshima-
maru, eventually after the trouble with the British 
Fig.18, A silk-reeling manufacture.
Source: ibid., p.203.
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government, then the ruler of the colonial India 
(the so-called “Bombay Cotton-shipping Case”). 
Thus, young Japanese capitalism entered into 
confrontation with Britain in East-Asian market 
from its very beginning. 
2. Silk Manufacture and Japanese Capitalism
Silk reeling industry was developed as 
peasant's side job in the relatively cool districts 
like Shinshû and the Northern Kantô. They used 
very simple tool for reeling, the so-called, Zaguri, 
which was used till 1894 as the major tool. The 
prosperous peasant-landowner began to manage 
sericulture and serici-paper works from the lasting 
days of the shogunate period. After the success 
of the governmental pilot-plant, Tomioka Seishi-
jô, which introduced mechanical silk reeling, 
many small, local capitals (especially in Shinshû 
and Kiryû) rushed into this industry. However, 
in the case of silk reeling, the mechanization 
could not exclude hand-work. Therefore, the 
manufacturers had to depend upon the cheap labor 
that was comprised of the girls. Moreover, silk-
textile industry depended on peasant's side job 
except for large cities like Kyoto. In this meaning, 
the silk industry had a pre-modern character as a 
whole, which was not so attractive for the bankers 
and large investors even then. However, it can 
be said that the turnover of prosperous peasants 
to the capitalists succeeded exceptionally in this 
industry. After the so-called Matsukata Deflation 
for overcoming the inflation caused by the civil 
wars which led the economic depression, it became 
difficult to found new companies and factories in 
this industry (1882-).
*  *  *
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V. Industrial Revolution II― Establishment 
of the heavy industries and their military-
related character
1. Nisshin Sengo-Keiei (Postwar State Management 
after the Sino-Japanese War)
A brilliant talent of Kôza-ha, Noro, Eitarô 
once characterized Japanese Industrial Revolution 
that it consisted of the relatively independent two 
phases; “Lancashire-type Industrial Revolution 
of light industries” and “Birmingham-type 
Industrial Revolution of the heavy industries” 
which continuously followed after the former. 
The Industrial Revolution of the heavy industries 
was promoted not on the basis of the indigenous 
accumulation of capital, but on the basis of a great 
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sum of the compensation from the Qin Dynasty 
that the Japanese government obtained as the result 
of Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Japan gained 
totally 231,500,000 taels; 200,000,000 taels as 
“Compensation for military-recovery,” 1,500,000 
taels as “Redemption for the Defense Expense 
in Weihai-wei (Ikai-ei)” and 30,000,000 taels as 
“Remuneration for Rendition of Liáodông (Ryôtô) 
Peninsula.” The total sum was worth 38,080,000 
GB pounds or 360,000,000 yen (for three years of 
National Budget). Treasurer, Matsukata, Masayoshi 
took advantage of this opportunity for the policy-
set, the so-called, Nisshin Sengo-Keiei (Postwar 
State Management) . 
The main target of Nisshin Sengo-Keiei was 
to reinforce the military forces in preparation for 
the future, possible war with Russia that was in 
confrontation with Japan after the Sino-Japanese 
War and to promote the heavy industries which 
could support the newest and powerful military 
armament. To attain such goals, the Japanese 
government took such vital measures as follows: 
(1) The imperial Army newly established 6 new 
infantry divisions (total of 12 infantry divisions), 2 
divisions of cavalrymen and artillerymen and the 
Imperial Navy constructed a large fl eet consisting 
of six 10,000-ton class steel-covered battleships. 
(2) In 1896, Imperial Parliament adopted to 
spend a total of 4,095,700 yen for foundation of 
a giant steel works, which was realized as Yahata 
State Iron & Steel Works (to be mentioned later). 
(3) The railway (to be mentioned later) and the 
telegraphic communication networks were largely 
expanded. (4) The army and navy arsenals were 
enlarged. (5) Navigation Encouragement Act and 
Shipbuilding Encouragement Act were adopted for 
the sake of promotion of marine transportation and 
shipbuilding: 66% of Governmental Grant-in-aid 
for Shipbuilding was delivered to Mitsubishi, and 
26 % – Kawasaki) in 1896.
The establishment and stabilization of 
the modernized financial system to promote 
the industries and the international linkage of 
Japanese economy were also the main object of 
Nisshin Sengo-Keiei. Several semi-governmental 
investment banks were founded one after another; 
Nihon Kangyô Ginkô (Japan Bank for Promotion 
of Industries) for long-term loans on the real 
estate mortgage in 1897, Nô-kô Ginkô (Banks 
for Agriculture and Industry) in 1897, Hokkaido 
Takushoku Ginkô (Colonial Bank for Development 
of Hokkaido) in 1900 and Nihon Kôgyô Ginkô 
(Industrial Bank of Japan) for long-term loans on 
valuable securities mortgage in 1902. 
The gold standard currency was established 
(0.75g of pure gold as 1 yen) in 1897 in the place 
of the gold-silver double standard currency system 
established in 1870, in accordance with sharp fall 
or instability of silver price in Eastern Asia due 
to the large scale outflow of silver from China 
for the compensation to Japan (being afraid of 
fl owing-out of silver, the government didn’t stamp 
large silver coins after this currency reform). For 
the establishment of the stabilized foreign trade 
account, the Bank of Japan entrusted the assurance 
of Japanese foreign trade settlements to the Bank 
of England on Japanese gold the Bank of England 
secured. Thus, Japan succeeded in participation 
into the world economy. 
2. The Development of the Heavy Industries. 
Yahata State Iron & Steel Works: The coke-
blast furnaces with capacity of 160 tons with a hot 
wind blower were built (Before then, Kamaishi 
blast-furnace capacity was only five tons at first, 
and then enlarged to 25 tons). The 25 ton-class 
open-hearth furnaces with the electric charging 
machine were equipped, which expelled completely 
the reverberators and the crucible furnaces which 
were then studded at various places. The 10 
ton-class Bessemer converters were utilized as 
auxiliary refi ning furnaces. As for the raw material 
supply, iron ore from Kamaishi and Kamaishi-pig 
iron were quickly replaced with imported ore from 
Fig.20, Hitachi-maru




China and Southeast Asia. 
Steel making technology was widespread to 
private firms (Relatively small steel makers only 
with an open-hearth furnace or an electric-arc 
furnace using Indian-pig iron and the US scrap 
iron).
Fig.19, The opening ceremony of Yahata State Iron 
& Steel Works.
Source: Internet Source (https://trc-adeac.trc.co.jp/ Html/
image/4020605100/4020605100100010/ 3-2-3-1-1.
jpg)
Ship building: Building of a huge commercial 
cargo and passenger ship, Hitachi-maru (6,200 
tons, 2,000 horsepower, and mild steel armored) 
was completed in 1898 in Mitsubishi's Nagasaki 
Shipyard. That was monumental as an example 
announcing the full acquisition of modern ship-
building engineering by Japanese engineers and 
shipyard workers. Moreover, in 1887, an engineer, 
Miyahara, Jirô, invented Miyahara-type tuberous 
boiler so efficient by adopting the curved pipes 
absorbing the swelling and shrinkage of the pipes 
(Later, however, the Japanese boiler market was 
monopolized by Babcock & Wilcox Co.) 
Railway: Thanks to the fund-raising activities 
by Shibusawa, Ei-ichi and his colleagues, several 
private railroad companies were founded based 
upon concentration of capital from the former lords 
and the privileged merchants; Japanese Railway 
Company (from Tokyo to Aomori) was founded 
in 1881, the San-yô Railway Company – in 1888, 
the Kyûshû Railway Company – in 1888 and the 
Hokkaido Colliery Railway Company – in 1889. 
However, the development of the private railways 
seems to have been so slow for the government that 
hurried to build the railway network all over the 
territory. The government denied the spontaneous 
development of the private railroad and purchased 
the private railway facilities since 1887 under the 
guideline, the so-called “Revived Principle of 
Government-building Trunk Lines,” established by 
Inoue, Masaru, Director of Department of Railroad. 
The railway between Ôtsu and Kyoto was 
constructed by Japanese only, without any help 
and advice from the engineers dispatched to Japan 
from European countries and America.  Although 
in those days, the locomotives had to be imported, 
they ran on the railway of Japanese construction. 
M a c h i n e r y :  S h i b a u r a  E n g i n e e r i n g 
Works  ( today’s  Toshiba )  manufac tured  a 
1,300-horsepower steam  engine in 1896 for 
Kanegafuchi Bôseki (Kanebô). However, the age of 
steam engines was so short in Japan and, as early 
as in 1910, the age of the turbine began. Besides 
factory engines, Kobe Factory of Department 
of Railroad constructed a 1B1 type steam 
locomotive by Japanese only in 1893 (However, 
the establishment of the systematic domestic 
production began only in 1912). 
In 1905, Ikegai Iron Works tried to copy 
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the lathes made in the United States. However, 
the establishment of the systematic domestic 
production could not be seen before WWII. 
Mines: Mitsui Miike Colliery, Takashima 
Colliery, Ikuno Silver Mine and Sado Gold Mine 
were disposed to the Mitsubishi group. Besshi 
Copper Mine was owned by the Sumitomo family 
since the shogunate period. Ashio Copper Mine 
was purchased by Furukawa, Ichibei. Such mining 
businesses were prosperous in accordance with the 
development of industrialization and exportation 
and, then, became the roots of the conglomerates, 
i.e. the so-called Zaibatsu. 
3. The Establishment of Japanese Capitalism
Japanese capitalism in its earliest days 
was composed of the following sectors: (1) the 
flourishing cotton spinning industry which was 
rapidly developed upon the investments from the 
former feudal ruler class; (2) the relatively large 
silk reeling industry as one of the most important 
export industries, in which the growth and turnover 
of the prosperous peasants to the modern capitalists 
can be seen exceptionally; (3) the foreign trade 
businesses and heavy industries such as the marine 
transportation, the trading companies, the coal 
mines, the copper mines and the ship-building 
yards which were organized by Zaibatsu, the semi-
feudalistic privileged merchants; (4) the large-
scale governmental industries, such as the Army 
and Naval arsenals and Yahata State Iron & Steel 
Works; and (5) the poor farming villages which 
was not modernized and remained as it was in 
the pre-modern times, as the main supplier of the 
cheep labor power to the modernized industries. 
Immediately after the completion of their own type 
of the Industrial Revolution, Japanese capitalism 
entered into a serious confrontation with the 
European and American advanced countries about 
the Asian markets due to its essential dependence 
upon the latter as the sales markets of their 
industrial products and the purchase market of the 
raw materials, in spite of the dependence upon 
the European and American markets as the sales 
markets of their silk, copper, coal, tea leaves and 
others and the purchase market of the advanced 
manufacturing machines and industrial equipment. 
*  *  *
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VI. Development of Industrial Technology in 
the Inter-war Period.
1. Development of electrification and electric 
engineering industries 
It is often said that although the age of the 
steam engines in Japan was delayed for nearly one 
century than that in England, the age of electricity 
came to Japan simultaneously with some advanced 
European countries. Under the so-called “War of 
Currents,” in which the problem which current 
– direct or alternating – is suitable for power 
transmission was fi ercely discussed, the choice of 
technology in each country influenced the further 
economic growth of that country. The former 
“World’s Factory,” Great Britain, which left many 
direct current transmissions, was relatively delayed 
in electrifi cation and thus made way for the newly 
rising countries like Germany and Russia in this 
aspect (the Age of Uneven Development). Japan 
Fig.21, Asakusa Power station
Source: Internet Source (https://tanken.com/ tokyodento.
html)
Fig.22, The First Inawashiro Hydroelectric Power Plant 
under the construction and after the completion.
Source: Yamazaki, Toshio and Kimoto, Tada-aki, [Shin-
ban] Denki no Gijutsu-shi (A History of Electric 
Engineering. [New Version]. Publisher Ohm, 1992. 
P.316.
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successfully could ride on the tide of the three-
phase alternating current that was eventually 
accepted all through the world. 
The rapid growth of electrifi cation of national 
economy in Japan was quite amazing. As early 
as in 1887, two electric power plants, Asakusa 
Power station of Tokyo Electric Lamp Company 
and Nakanoshima Power Plant of Osaka Electrical 
Lamp Company which adopted the three-phase 
alternating current for the fi rst time in Japan, both 
in the two largest cities, entered into operation. 
Following them, the first hydro-power plant 
in Japan, Keage Municipal Power Plant, was 
constructed in Kyoto in 1892.  The first power 
plant for mining electrification was built in the 
Kosaka Mine in 1895.  The fi rst urban stations for 
general purpose were constructed in Kôriyama and 
Hiroshima in 1899, each of which had voltage of 
11,000v. and the power transmission line exceeding 
10 miles. The fi rst thermal power station equipped 
with steam turbines was built at Sen-ju in Tokyo in 
1906. Each of the four turbines had 1,500hps, and 
then, in the following year (1907), a large-scale 
hydro power station, Katsuragawa-Komahashi 
Hydro-Power Station (55,000v power transmission 
of 70km) was built. 
However, what is the most striking and 
historical event was the construction of the First 
Inawashiro Hydroelectric Power Plant in 1915; 
It generated 37,500kW in one year and had the 
high-voltage (115,000v) power transmission line 
for providing electricity to Tokyo in spite of a 
long distance from there (220km). Successively, 
Tatsushima Power Plant on the river Azusa-gawa 
was constructed 200km far from Yokohama in 
1923, which had 154,000v power transmission 
line. In the following year (1924), a contract on 
mutual purchase of electric power between Tokyo 
Electric Lamp Company and Daidô Electric Power 
Company was concluded. This means that the 
electric power network in the eastern part of Japan 
and that in the western part were connected with 
each other. 
After the establishment of Army and Navy 
Fuel Arsenals in 1939, the petroleum fuel was 
Fig.23, EF-52 type electric locomotive
Source: ibid., p. 318.
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delivered first of all to the Army and the Navy. 
In accordance with the decrease in the men labor 
power due to a large-scale conscription, the woman 
labor power and the Korean compulsorily moved 
to Japan were introduced into the coal pits.  For 
the sake of economy and rational distribution 
of fuel, the Imperial Parliament passed Act of 
State Control on Electricity in 1939, which was 
aimed at the unified control of totally 1,500 km 
super-electric network all over the territory by a 
semi-governmental enterprise, Nihon Hassôden 
Kabushiki Gaisha  (Nippatsu :  Japan Power 
Generation and Transmission Co.)  Nippatsu took 
the policy for increase of hydro-power potentials to 
economize the coal.
Such a rapid electrification was encouraged 
by the rapid growth of the electrical engineering 
companies which were blessed with the investment 
and provision of advanced technology from the 
foreign big enterprises; Shibaura Engineering 
Works tied up with the General Electric Co. in 
1909. Mitsubishi Electric Engineering Corporation 
which just became an independent firm from 
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding only in 1921, tied up with 
Westinghouse in 1923. In the same year, Furukawa 
Zaibatsu established Fuji Electric Engineering Co. 
Ltd., as a joint venture with the Siemens Group. 
The vertical shaft water mills and the dynamos 
were produced domestically for the first time in 
1918. The water-cooled transformer was first 
produced domestically in 1925. The 154kV oil 
breaker was manufactured by Hitachi and Shibaura 
in 1926. The fi rst domestically assembled electric 
locomotive (EF-52 type) began to work in 1928. 
Almost all items of electric engineering shifted to 
domestic production by 1936.
2. The Formation of the Four Major Manufacturing 
Districts 
Electrification liberated the location of 
factories from the geographical limitation that they 
had to be near to the collieries, water resources or 
other fuel resourcing places. In the Inter-war Period 
in Japan, the rapid electrification encouraged the 
formation of the major manufacturing districts.  
Keihin Manufacturing District: The large 
seashore zone in Tsurumi and Kawasaki areas 
between Tokyo and Yokohama was reclaimed 
by Asano, Sô-ichirô (completed in 1924). There 
became concentrated many heavy industrial 
facilities; Asano Cement Co., Nippon Steel Pipe 
Co. (which introduced a German-made blast 
furnace exceptionally for the private steel works 
in those days,) Tsurumi Steel and Shipbuilding 
Works (subsidiary to Asano Zaibatsu), Ishikawa-
Jima Shipyard, Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., 
Tsurumi Petroleum Refining Plant of Nihon 
Oil Co., Kawasaki Petroleum Refining Plant of 
Mitsubish Oil Co Ltd. and others.
Hanshin Manufacturing District: In the area 
between Osaka and Kobe, there were concentrated 
steel making, copper-refining, light metals and 
other works, many of which were subsidiary 
to Sumitomo Zaibatsu, such as Sumitomo Steel 
Works and Sumitomo Copper Refinement Works. 
Besides them, a number of small or medium-sized 
manufactures of metal-fabricating, ship-building, 
machine tool, electric engineering and other works 
were also located. 
What is striking in this manufacturing district 
is the frequent outbreaks of public nuisance 
cases;  The chlorine gas from Osaka Alkali Co.(in 
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1906/07), the soot and smoke from Sumitomo 
Copper Refi nement Co. and Nihon Cotton Spinning 
Co. (in 1914), those from Aji-gawa Higashi Power 
Station and Kasugade Power Station of Osaka 
Electric Lamp Co. (in 1919/20) annoyed the 
citizens around there.
Chûkyô Manufacturing District: There 
used to be concentrated many consumer goods 
industry such as textile, pottery and clocks around 
the city of Nagoya. Immediately after WWI, even 
while the other districts suffered from scarcity of 
electricity, this district had some surplus potential 
of electricity supply. Therefore, Daidô Steel Works, 
Nihon Insulators Ltd., Toyota Automatic Loom 
Works, Ltd. and others were located there. 
Kita-Kyûshû Manufacturing District: In 
accordance with its Third Enhancing Plan adopted 
in 1916, the productive potential of Yahata Iron 
& Steel Works was enlarged. With the main target 
of secondary use of the common resources, waste 
and/or the derivatives, Asahi Glass Co. Ltd and 
other chemical plants were built around Yahata 
Works. In Makiyama Plant of Asahi Glass, the 
ammonia soda process was introduced for the fi rst 
time in Japan. 
3. Rise of Chemical Industry
Besides the rapid electrification, the rapid 
growth of the new chemical industries also 
characterizes the successful industrial development 
of Japanese economy in the Inter-war Period. 
During and after the Industrial Revolution, acid 
and alkali, the basic chemical products in those 
days were provided by the three major chemical 
companies; Nihon Seimi (in Onoda City), Osaka 
Ryûsô and Osaka Alkali. 
In the Inter-war Period, some chemical 
industr ial  complexes were also formed in 
accordance with the growth of the new chemical 
industries. (1) The Ômuta District near Mitsui 
Miike Colliery: there alizarin, naphthalene and 
other organic-synthesized chemical goods were 
produced from the exhausted tar and benzenes and 
others were produced from the exhausted gas from 
the colliery. Electrochemical factories using the 
electricity from Ôyodo River Hydroelectric Power 
Plant of Kumamoto Electricity Co. provided the 
carbide, which was processed to ammonium sulfate 
through lime-nitrogen by Frank-Caro Process 
introduced by Fujiyama Jô-ichi. (2) Niihama 
District (in Shikoku Island): There sulfuric acid 
industry was developed depending upon the 
sulfate iron ore from the Sumitomo Besshi Copper 
Mine and the sulfurous acid gas from refinement 
process of copper. Electric refi nement of the metals 
such as gold, silver, high purity copper, nickel, 
selenium and palladium was widely adopted there. 
(3) Hokuriku District: There, surplus hydro-
electric power was effectively utilized for a variety 
of electrochemical processes: The plants of Chû-
Etsu Electric Industry, Hokkai Electrochemical, 
Tôa Chemical Synthesis Industry Co., Ôji Paper 
Manufacturing, Nihon Soda Co.,  Shin-Etsu 
Chemical Co., Niigata Electric Industry, Nissan 
Chemical Industries, Shôwa Denkô Co. Ltd. and 
others were located around there. Among them, 
the plants of Nihon Soda Co. and Shôwa Denkô 
supplied a large amount of chemical fertilizer 
(ammonium sulfate) which was increasingly 
demanded after Kome-Sôdô (Riot for Rice). (4) The 
Western Part of Setouchi District: the traditional 
chemical industries of cement, acid and soda were 
located there using the coal and lime in Ube and 
Onoda areas. 
Among such a remarkable development of 
various chemical industries, the rapid growth of 
Nihon Chisso-Hiryô Kabushiki-Kaisha (Japan 
Nitrogen Fertilizer Ltd.) established by a young 
venture capitalist, Noguchi, Jun  (exactly – 
Shitagau) in 1908 is notable. Noguchi adopted 
Frank-Caro Process for ammonia production and 
purchased the patent of nitrogen fi xation method in 
1921, with which the lime-nitrogen was effectively 
synthesized as the intermediate chemical goods 
Fig.25, A general view of Hung-nam Complex.
Source: Internet Source (https://gogogoda.amebaownd. 
com/posts/6060003)
Fig.26, Takury-gô.
Source: Internet Source (https://minkara.carview. co.jp/
userid/952383/blog/41785624/)
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for ammonia production. His company advanced 
into Korean Peninsula in 1927 to obtain cheap 
electricity and cheap labor power; they developed 
Bu-Jongang River, constructed a huge hydro-
power station and a large-scale chemical industrial 
complex named Hung-nam Complex. In accordance 
with the move of the production base of chemical 
fertilizer (ammonium sulfate) to Korea, the 
products from their main plant, Minamata Plant, 
were diversified since 1928. They adventurously 
adopted polymer chemical processes.  In 1932, an 
engineer, Hashimoto, Hikohichi invented a unique 
method for reactivation of the mercury catalyst for 
the synthesis of acetylene from which acetic acid 
was produced. The acetic acid induced products 
such as acetate rayon, safety glass and polyvinyl-
alcohol fiber became the major products of this 
company. They also engaged in the production of 
the vinyl chloride since 1941. 
Fig.24, The calcium cyanamide reactors in Minamata 
factory of Nihon Chisso-Hiryô Kabushiki-Kaisha
Source: Internet Source (https://tanken.com/tisso.html)
After the second half of 1930s, Kanebô, 
Kurashiki Ken-shoku, Tôyô Rayon and other textile 
manufacturers engaged in the synthesis of various 
synthetic fibers. Nihon Tire, Nihon Carbide, 
Nihon Kasei, Mitsui and Sumitomo affiliated 
manufacturers and others engaged in synthetic 
rubber. 
4. The Development of the Machine Industries as 
an Achilles’ Tendon to Japanese Capitalism 
The automobile industry lead the magnifi cent 
development of mechanical engineering in the 20th 
century’s world history, especially in the United 
States. For the fi rst time in Japanese history, Tokyo 
Automobile Works domestically manufactured 
their own automobile, Takury-gô. However, 
that company came to a deadlock soon after 
the beginning of the sales of their automobiles. 
Following them, Kai-shin sha Co. assembled only 
six or seven cars of their own DAT type (powered 
10 horsepower and equipped with 2 water-cooled 
vertical cylinders and a three-step speed changer) 
in their small works with only about 30 machine 
tools. Tokyo Gas and Electric Co. assembled the 
tracks specified for the army use since 1917. 
Such manufacturers producing the army tracks 
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was continuously promoted by the Military-using 
Automobile Manufacturer Protection Act. 
Ishikawa-Jima  Shipyard assembled the 
automobiles in cooperation with a Brit ish 
automobile company, Wolseley Co. in 1920, which 
was the earliest instance of the cooperation with a 
foreign company. However, the prime cost was so 
expensive as more than 10,000 yen. After Wolseley, 
the U.S. Ford Company and General Motors Co. 
advanced into the Japanese automobile market in 
1925. Japan Ford Co. built the Yokohama Midori-
machi Factory. In 1926, Japan General Motors Co. 
was founded. They built their own Osaka Factory. 
Around these factories, the local repair works and 
the manufacturers of the parts, such as Tobata 
Casting Co. were developed. 
In 1930s, many manufacturers entered into 
the automobile industry with the expectation about 
the increase in the military demand for the tracks 
being sent to the Chinese front; Tôyô Cork Industry 
Co. (later, Mazda), the Engine Manufacturing Co. 
(later, Daihatsu), Mitsubishi Kobe Shipyards and 
Toyota Automatic Loom Works, Ltd. For the sake 
of security keeping (at least nominally) and the 
promotion of the domestic army track production, 
Automobile Industry Act adopted in 1936 limited 
the automobile assembly business to domestic 
manufacturers. After such measures adopted, 
Toyota and Nissan monopolized the production of 
the private cars. However, a part of the material, 
many of machine tools and tools were continuously 
imported. For example, Nissan constructed a 
factory on the basis of the blueprint and the capital 
equipment purchased from Graham Page Ltd. 
Not only the automobile industry, but also 
many other machine industries depended upon 
the imports as the major supplier of advanced 
mechanical equipment such as shipbuilding 
equipment, heavy industrial machines, Arsenals’ 
equipment and electric machines. On the other 
hand, the small casting works were clustered in 
Kawaguchi, Kuwana, Tobata, Sakai and other 
cities. Most of them hired only one cupola 
and the technology there remained craftwork 
level. However, among them, an outstanding 
entrepreneur, Ayukawa, Yoshisuke, later the founder 
of the Nissan conglomerate, introduced advanced 
then technology such as the electric furnaces and 
the electric annealing furnaces in Tobata in 1920. 
Beside, an engineer and entrepreneur, Utsunomiya, 
Tokutarô succeeded in the domestic production 
of drills in 1923. However, the domestic 
manufacturing of pits and cutters succeeded only in 
1929. The weak development and the dependence 
upon the import of the machine industries became 
an Achilles’ tendon to Japanese capitalism.
*  *  *
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VII. Organization of Research and Development 
in Pre-war Japan 
1. Impact of World War I
After Japan’s participation in World War I 
(then, the European Great War) in 1914, Japanese 
national economy suffered from the scarcity of 
medicine, dyestuff, fertilizer and other chemical 
products, most of which had been imported 
from Germany. In order to take the effective 
countermeasures against the serious shortage of 
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chemical goods, especially chemical fertilizer, 
the government established Ad hoc Board of 
Investigation on Chemical Industry in November 
of 1914. While this board was reorganized and 
renamed to Ad hoc  Nitrogen Laboratory in 
May of 1918 and, at last, Tokyo State Industrial 
Research Institute in 1928, they fi nally succeeded 
in industrialization of Haber process in 1929. 
Such long-time efforts eventually bore a fruitful 
result; They invented their own, effective way of 
ammonia synthesis.  
On the basis  of  the contribution from 
S u m i t o m o  Z a i b a t s u  ( 2 1 , 0 0 0 y e n )  f o r  t h e 
development of substitute special steel, Second 
Section of Ad hoc  Physical  and Chemical 
Laboratory affi liated to Tôhoku Imperial University 
was founded in April of 1916. After the war, the 
laboratory was reorganized to an independent Steel 
Laboratory in 1919 and was renamed as Metallic 
Material Laboratory in 1922, which played the 
significant role as a center of material sciences 
based upon quantum dynamics.
In 1917,  Nihon Kôgaku  Company Ltd. 
(now Nikon Co.) was founded on the basis of 
the investment from the Imperial Navy for the 
substitute development of optical lens which were 
then imported mainly from Germany.
The Navy established Naval Aircraft Research 
Laboratory in 1918, which was reorganized to 
Naval Research Institute of Technology in 1923 
and played the important role in development of 
electronics engineering.
The government established Munitions Bureau 
affiliated to Cabinet in April of 1918, which was 
the first governmental agency for the wartime 
mobilization planning in Japan.
2. Riken (Institute of Physical and Chemical 
Research)
A prominent chemist, Takamine, Jôkichi, 
then the Chair of Ad hoc Board of Investigation 
on Chemical Industry, submitted his proposition 
to the government, appealing the inevitability of 
the establishment of an enormous, comprehensive 
r e s e a r c h  i n s t i t u t e  m o d e l e d  o n  G e r m a n 
Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt (PTR), 
tentatively named Kokumin Kagaku Kenkyû-jo 
(the National Institute for Scientific Research). 
He wrote, “(Japan) shall keep a position among 
the most advanced countries in the world… We 
shall widely extent the market for the our products 
and get the wealth of the world.” His proposition 
was eventually accepted and Rikagaku Kenkyû-
jo (shortened  Riken; Institute of Physical and 
Chemical Research) was established in Tokyo 
in March of 1917 as a juridical foundation. 
The government financed 2million yen, a large 
variety of the private companies contributed 
totally 2.2million yen and the Emperor donated 
1 million. Having gathered excellent scientific 
talents from all over Japan, Riken achieved 
remarkable successes; The colleagues of Riken 
issued 2,004 scientific papers written in Japanese 
and 1,164 papers written in European languages 
from 1917 to 1945. They obtained approximately 
800 domestic patents and 200 foreign patents, and 
especially, a prominent physicist, Nishina, Yoshio 
who pioneered nuclear physics in Japan engaged 
so actively in experimental work. His laboratory 
finally constructed one of the largest cyclotrons 
in those days. Nishina Laboratory in Riken was 
involved in Japan’s atomic bomb project named as 
“Ni-gô” after the initial letter of his surname.
As a countermeasure against the temporary 
financial difficulty in the depression after WWI, 
the third Director, Baron Ôkôchi, Masatoshi 
attempted to make their own research funds by 
selling their own inventions: Vitamin A, Synthetic 
Sake, the measurement instruments, the medicines 
and others. He established even a dealer company, 
Rikagaku Kôgyô Co. (1927) and other companies 
for this purpose. Such companies were increased 
one after another and eventually composed a 
conglomerate, the so-called, Riken Konzern. 
Fig.27, The head offi ce of Rikagaku Kenkyû-jo
Source: Internet Source (https://ja.wikipedia.org/ wiki/E7%
90%86%E5%8C%96%E5%AD%A6%E7%A0%94
%7%A9%B6%E6%89%80)
Fig.28, The completion of the electromagnet for the large 
cyclotron at Riken.
Source: Tamaki, Hidehiko and Ezawa, Hiroshi ed., Nishina 
Yoshio, Misuzu Pub.,1991.From the pages of photos
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3. Mobilization to Devastation 
For  the  sake  of  inv i ta t ion  of  fore ign 
investment, the government held a large-scale 
business meeting, Bankoku Kôgyô Kaigi (World 
Engineering Conference) in October of 1929, 
inviting various foreign entrepreneurs, investors 
and engineers. Although this attempt failed in its 
main purpose, the Sangyô-shingikai (Deliberative 
Council on Industrial Problems), which was 
established as one of the consequence of this 
Conference, played a signifi cant role in the spread 
of the Japanese style of employment system (the 
life-time employment, on-the-job training and 
the seniority system), the scientific management 
methods and the promotion of the industrial 
standardization and the industrial rationalization 
movement. 
Also in that year (1929), Technical High 
Schools in Tokyo and Osaka were promoted 
to Tokyo and Osaka Institutes (universities) 
of Technology. At the same time, some state 
universities were newly found. And then, following 
Department of Scientific Industrial Research of 
UK as a model, Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Science was established with the government fund 
of 20 million yen, which distributed grants-in-aid 
for the scientific research useful for the state and 
controlled the research activities of various groups 
and scientists through Research Committees 
organized within the Society. Since that moment, 
some grant-in-aid systems or subsidy systems for 
the promotion of scientific research were piled 
up complicatedly. In 1939, Ministry of Education 
established Grant-in-Aid for Scientifi c Research (3 
million yen) mainly for the fundamental research. 
In May of 1941, Cabinet Decision, “The Outline 
of New Establishment of Science and Technology” 
was issued to systematize the mobilization of 
scientific talents and research potentials. As 
more serious the governmental finance became 
in accordance with the progress of the war, the 
government founded a new system, Kenkyû 
Tonarigumi (Research Groups) in 1943 in attempt 
to obtain the scientific fruits only from grouping 
the scientists without any expenditure. 
It is often said that the R&D efforts to make 
the atomic bomb, the radar (half developed), 
the homicide ray and others bore no fruitful 
result except for the cultivation of penicillin 
and the development of technique of the science 
administration. However, so-called “Invisible 
Colleges” formed through the relatively free 
scientific exchanges between the mobilized 
scientists in the Kenkyû Tonarigumi and others had 
some positive infl uence for the Post-war fl ourishing 
of scientific and industrial research, especially in 
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the field of the properties of matter based upon 
quantum dynamics. In addition, we must take 
into consideration that some Japan's industrial 
potentials remained not so destroyed. In spite 
of heavy loss and damages upon the consumer-
goods industry and others by the U.S. air raids, the 
capacity of some industries such as the thermal 
power generation, the lime nitrogen production, 
the pulp manufacture and the iron & steel works 
remained not so lost. Those had been the basic 
conditions for the post-war economic recovery. 
[to be continued]
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Notes
1 See, Morris Low, Science and the Building of a New 
Japan. Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005; Morris Low ed., 
Building a Modern Japan: Science, Technology, and 
Medicine in the Meiji Era and Beyond. Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2005; Morris Low, Shigeru Nakayama and 
Hitoshi Yoshioka, Science, Technology and Society in 
Contemporary Japan. Cambridge University Press. 
2  The modern agricultural sciences was transplanted from 
Western countries in Meiji era (‘Nôji-shiken-jô’i.e., the 
Laboratories of Agriculture were established in various 
places throughout Japan). However, such efforts were 
not so fruitful. On the other hand, the actual knowledge 
of Rô-nô (the Old Farmers) who were trained before 
the introduction of Western knowledge and Nô-sho 
(guidebooks for farming) published before the Great 
Restoration were still useful.
3 How should we understand the political essence of 
the Meiji Restoration? This topic was the main target 
in the “Great Debate on Japanese Capitalism” in 
1930's. Here, in this lecture, following the view of 
the Kôza-ha (The group of historical and economic 
researchers who contributed to or were inspired by the 
Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu-shi Kôza [the Lectures 
on the History of Japanese Capitalism] in 7 volumes 
published by Iwanami Shoten in 1932-1933), we 
suppose its essence in the establishment of a unique 
kind of absolutism accompanied with the strong urge 
for modernization of the country on the basis of self-
dissolution of the feudalism.
4 Recently, in the study of economic history of Modern 
Japan, more pluralistic and compound understanding 
of Japanese modern economy has obtained increasing 
support (as for such a new current, see, for example, 
Meiji-Ishin Gakkai ed., Kôza: Meiji-Isin. Vol.8: 
Meiji-Ishin no Keizai Katei [A Course on the Meiji 
Restoration. Vol 8, Economic Process behind the Meiji 
Restoration] Yûshi-sha, 2010; Sakane Yoshihiro and 
Mori Ryôji ed. Nihon no Keizai Hatten wo Dô Toraeru 
ka? [How Should We Understand the Economic Growth 
of Japan?] Seibun-dô, 2019). This text doesn’t follow 
such a recent development of the study in the economic 
history of modern Japan sufficiently. Therefore the 
following parts have some limitation. 
